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Abstract. The spi-calculus is a formal model for the design and analysis
of cryptographic protocols: many security properties, such as authenti-
cation and strong confidentiality, can be reduced to the verification of
behavioural equivalences between spi processes. In this paper we provide
an algorithm for deciding hedged bisimilarity on finite processes, which is
equivalent to barbed equivalence (and coarser than framed bisimilarity).
This algorithm works with any term equivalence satisfying a simple set
of conditions, thus encompassing many different encryption schemata.
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1 Introduction
The spi calculus, introduced by Abadi and Gordon in [2], is a process calcu-
lus designed for the description and formal verification of cryptographic proto-
cols. Many security properties, such as authentication and strong confidentiality,
can be reduced to the verification of may-testing equivalences between spi pro-
cesses. Since may-testing equivalences are difficult to check in practice, other
behavioural equivalences have been put forward for this calculus. In [1] Abadi
and Gordon defined framed bisimilarity, a bisimulation-style equivalence which is
a sound approximation of may-testing equivalence. Later, other context-sensitive
equivalences have been proposed; in particular, Borgstro¨m and Nestmann defined
hedged bisimilarity [3], which is shown to be equivalent to barbed equivalence and
strictly coarser than framed bisimilarity. We refer to [3] for a detailed comparison
of these equivalences, which we summarize in Figure 1.
Hu¨ttel [4] proved that framed bisimilarity is decidable on finite processes. In
this paper, we extend this result, proving that also hedged bisimilarity (and hence
barbed equivalence) is decidable on finite processes. Moreover, we do not choose
a specific congruence over terms; rather, the algorithm works with any congru-
ence relation, as long as some mild conditions are satisfied. Therefore, our algo-
rithm can be readily applied to different encryption/decryption schemata just
by changing the congruence rules. These conditions are introduced in Section 2,
where we recall also the syntax and late operational semantics of spi-calculus. In
Section 3 we define the notion of hedged bisimilarity using this late semantics,
and in Section 4 we show that it is decidable on finite spi-calculus processes (i.e.
processes without replication); an algorithm in pseudo-code is provided. Some
concluding remarks and directions for future work are in Section 5.
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Fig. 1. Behavioural equivalences for the spi calculus [3].
2 The spi calculus
The spi-calculus extends the π-calculus with terms and primitives for encryption
and decryption. In this section we define the variant we consider in this paper.
2.1 Syntax
Terms We first define the set of terms that can be used by processes, following [3].
Definition 1 (Terms). Let N be a countable set of names ranged over by
a, b, c, n . . . , and V a countable set of variable symbols, ranged over by x, y, z . . . .
The set of spi-calculus terms is given by the grammar
A ::= a | x
t ::= A | (t1, t2) | π1(t) | π2(t) | {t1}t2 | Dt2(t1)
φ ::= true | ¬φ | φ1 ∧ φ2 | [t1 = t2]
Intuitively, {t1}t2 denotes the term t1 encrypted using key t2, and (t1, t2) denotes
the pair whose components are terms t1 and t2. Correspondingly, we have the
destructor Dt2(t1), which decrypts t1 using key t2, and the two projections π1(t),
π2(t). We use false as a shorthand for ¬true.
The set of (free) variables of a term t is denoted by fv(t); notice that there
are no binding operators in terms. As usual, a term t is said to be ground if
fv(t) = ∅, i.e. without (free) variables. It is said to be a message if it is ground
and without occurrences of π1(.), π2(.) and D.(.) operators. We will denote with
M the set of all messages, ranged over by M,N .
Unlike [2,4], our terms are typed. Types are defined by the following syntax:
τ ::= N | B | τ1 × τ2 | C(τ)
where N,B are the base types of names and booleans respectively, and C(τ) is
the type of encrypted terms of type τ . Formally, the typing judgment t : τ over
ground terms is defined by the following rules.
a ∈ N
a : N true : B
φ : B
¬φ : B
φ1 : B φ2 : B
φ1 ∧ φ2 : B [t1 = t2] : B
t1 : τ1 t2 : τ2
(t1, t2) : τ1 × τ2
t : τ1 × τ2
πi(t) : τi
i = 1, 2
t1 : τ t2 : N
{t1}t2 : C(τ)
t1 : C(τ) t2 : N
Dt2(t1) : τ
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Congruence over terms Terms are taken up-to some structural congruence ≡,
whose aim is to express the evaluation internal to processes, in particular the
execution of encryption/decryption algorithms. Differently from [2–4], we aim
to account for different type of encryption algorithms that can be expressed
by choosing the structural equivalence ≡. To this end, we provide a general
definition of “coherent” congruence:
Definition 2 (Coherent Congruence). A congruence relation ≡ over terms
is coherent if the following hold:
1. (Type preservation) ∀t1 : τ1, t2 : τ2∀j, k ∈ N : {t1}k ≡ {t2}j ⇒ τ1 = τ2
2. (Equivariance) ∀t1, t2 : C(τ) ∀a ∈ N ∀b ∈ N \ (n(t1) ∪ n(t2)) : t1 ≡ t2 ⇐⇒
t1{b/a} ≡ t2{b/a}
3. (Deterministic decryption) ∀t1, t2 : C(τ) : t1 ≡ t2 ⇒ ds(t1) = ds(t2)
where n(t) is the set of all names occurring in t, t{s/a} is the syntactical sub-
stitution replacing all occurrences of a in t with the term s, and ds(.) is defined
inductively by the clauses
ds(n ∈ N ) = n ds((t1, t2)) = (ds(t1), ds(t2)) ds({t1}t2) = ds(t1)
The first condition says that two encrypted terms can be considered equal only
if they encrypt messages with the same type. The second condition imposes the
absence of special names (and keys): if a property holds for a name, then it must
hold for every fresh name. The third condition says that congruence must be
consistent with decryption: the decryption of a message M is thus guaranteed
to be deterministic w.r.t. all messages in the same equivalence class of M .
It is easy to check that the equivalence used in [2–4] respects these conditions.
Other encryption algorithms (and other abstract data types) can be considered
by adapting the congruence relation, as long as it remains coherent; for example,
we can analyze encryption protocols with commutative ciphers (like RSA) by
adding the axiom ∀M : τ ∀k, j ∈ N : {{M}k}j ≡ {{M}j}k.
Processes We can now define the processes of the spi-calculus.
Definition 3 (Processes). The spi-calculus processes are defined as follows:
P ::= 0 | A(x).P | A〈t〉.P | P1|P2 | P1 + P2 | (νa)P |!P | φ.P | let x = t in P
where t and φ are respectively a well-typed term and a boolean formula, x is a
variable, a is a name and A can be both a name or a variable.
The syntax above are the usual ones from π-calculus, with these differences:
– input/output operations exchange terms, not only names and variables;
– φ.P is the guard operator, that behaves as P if the boolean formula φ holds;
– let x = t in P is the let operator that computes the value of t, assigns it to
the variable x and then executes P .
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Without loss of generality, we can assume that destructors (π1(.), π2(.) and
D.(.)) do not occur in boolean predicates [t1 = t2], nor in the argument of output
operations A〈t〉.P , since these cases can be simulated using the let. For instance,
a〈π1(t)〉.P is equivalent to let x = π1(t) in a〈x〉.P , for x 6∈ fv(P ).
Processes are taken up-to the usual structural congruence familiar from the
π-calculus theory:
P ≡ Q if P and Q are α-equivalent !P ≡ P |!P
P |Q ≡ Q|P (P |Q)|R ≡ P (Q|R)
P +Q ≡ Q+ P (P +Q) +R ≡ P + (Q +R)
(νm)(P |Q) ≡ (νm)P |Q if m 6∈ fn(Q) (νm)(νn)P ≡ (νn)(νm)P
(νm)0 ≡ 0 P |0 ≡ P
P ≡ Q
P |R ≡ Q|R
P ≡ Q
P +R ≡ Q +R
P ≡ Q
(νm)P ≡ (νm)Q
2.2 Semantics
To define the operational semantics of the spi-calculus we need to evaluate terms
and boolean expressions. Evaluation is defined over well-typed terms, where each
type denotes a set of values:
Definition 4 (Interpretation of types). The interpretation of types [[·]] :
Types→ Set is defined recursively as follows:
[[N]] = N
[[B]] = {true, false}
[[C(τ)]] = {{M}k |M : C(τ), k ∈ N}/≡
[[τ1 × τ2]] = {(M1,M2) |M1 ∈ [[τ1]],M2 ∈ [[τ2]]}/≡
Definition 5 (Evaluation). The evaluation for ground terms and boolean ex-
pressions is a partial function [[·]] : Mτ ⇀ [[τ ]] (implicitly parametric in the type
τ) defined recursively as follows:
[[a]] = a ∈ N [[(t1, t2)]] = ([[t1]], [[t2]])
[[true]] = true [[π1(t)]] = v1 if [[t]] = (v1, v2)
[[φ1 ∧ φ2]] = [[φ1]] ∧ [[φ2]] [[π2(t)]] = v2 if [[t]] = (v1, v2)
[[¬φ]] = ¬[[φ]] [[{t1}t2 ]] = {[[t1]]}[[t2]]
[[[t1 = t2]]] = true if [[t1]] ≡ [[t2]]; false otherwise
[[Dt2(t1)]] = t ∈ τ if k = [[t2]] ∈ N and [[t1]] ≡ {t}k ∈ [[C(τ)]]
We will write [[t]] ↓ if the evaluation of t produces a value, [[t]] ↑ otherwise – i.e.
when the evaluation of a decryption or a projection is unsuccessful.
Following [2, 4] (and differently from [3]) we define a late input style op-
erational semantics. We first define the reduction relation, which describes how
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processes unfold and execute internal computations in preparation for a reaction.
[[φ]] = true
φ.P > P
[[t]] = v
let x = t in P > P{v/x}
P > P ′
P ≡ P ′
where v is the value of t (up-to congruence), if defined.
The next step is to define abstractions F and concretions C:
F ::= (x)P C ::= (νm1 . . .mn)〈M〉Q n ≥ 0
where the variable x is bound in P and names m1, . . . ,mn are bound in M,Q.
As we will see in the semantic rules, an input a(x).P becomes an abstraction
after performing a transition labeled a; this abstraction can be seen as a process
waiting to receive a message on channel a. An output a〈M〉.Q becomes a con-
cretion (νm)〈M〉Q, where m are fresh names that can appear inM and P . This
concretion can be seen as a process waiting to send a message on the channel a.
An abstraction (x)P and a concretion (νm)〈M〉Q can interact via synchro-
nization resulting in a process where the messageM is received by (x)P . In order
to define this interaction, we need to extend restriction and parallel composition
operators to abstractions and concretions, as follows:
(νm)(x)P , (x)(νm)P
(νn)(νm)〈M〉P ,
{
(νn,m)〈M〉P if n ∈ fn(M)
(νm)〈M〉(νn)P otherwise
R|(x)P , (x)(R|P ) where x 6∈ fv(R)
R|(νm)〈M〉P , (νm)〈M〉(R|P ) where {m} ∩ fn(R) = ∅
where the two last definitions can be always applied, by α-conversion.
Finally, the operational semantics of the spi-calculus is represented by a la-
belled transition relation P
α
−→ D, where D ranges over processes, concretions
and abstractions, and α ∈ {a, a | a ∈ N} ∪ {τ} is the label. As usual, the tran-
sition labelled with τ is also called silent transition or τ -transition. The relation
is defined by the rules given in Figure 2. As usual, we also define
P =⇒ Q
△
⇐⇒ P
τ
−→
∗
Q P
α
=⇒ Q
△
⇐⇒ P =⇒
α
−→ Q
3 Hedged bisimilarity
In this section we define the hedged bisimilarity, introduced in [3]. The basic idea
is to mimic the frame-theory pairs of the framed bisimilarity defined in [1], but
dropping the separate frame component and including corresponding names as
part of the theory. The resulting theory is then called a hedge.
Definition 6 (Hedge). Let M be a set of messages. A hedge is a finite subset
of M2. We denote by H the set of all hedges.
A hedge h is consistent if and only if it is pair-free (i.e. all messages in h
are not pairs) and whenever (M,N) ∈ h we have that:
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(input)
a ∈ N
a(x)P
a
−→ (x)P
(output)
[[t]] =M a ∈ N
a〈t〉P
a
−→ (ν)〈M〉P
(interaction)
P
n
−→ (x)P ′ Q
n
−→ (νm)〈M〉Q′
P |Q
τ
−→ (νm)(P ′{M/x}|Q′)
{m} ∩ fn(P ′) = ∅
(restriction)
P
α
−→ D α 6∈ {m,m}
(νm)P
α
−→ (νm)D
(parallel)
P
α
−→ P ′
P |Q
α
−→ P ′|Q
(sum)
P
α
−→ P ′
P +Q
α
−→ P ′
(equivalence)
P ≡ Q Q
α
−→ Q′ Q′ ≡ P ′
P
α
−→ P ′
Fig. 2. Late operational semantics of the spi-calculus.
– M ∈ N ⇐⇒ N ∈ N ;
– for all (M ′, N ′) ∈ h, if M ≡M ′ or N ≡ N ′ then M =M ′ and N = N ′;
– if M ≡ {M ′}k e N ≡ {N ′}j then k 6∈ π1(h) and j 6∈ π2(h).
The first condition requires a consistent hedge to match names with names. The
second one requires that π1(h) and π2(h) are in bijection. The last one requires
that all encrypted messages cannot be decrypted using keys in h: encrypted
messages in a consistent hedge are not reducible.
Alongside (consistent) hedges, we define synthesis, analysis, irreducibles. The
synthesis of a hedge h is the set of message pairs that can be built from h.
Definition 7 (Synthesis). The synthesis S(h) of a hedge h is defined as the
least subset of M2 that satisfies:
– h ⊆ S(h);
– if (M,N) ∈ S(h), (k, j) ∈ S(h) and k, j ∈ N then ({M}k, {N}j) ∈ S(h);
– if (M1, N1) ∈ S(h) and (M2, N2) ∈ S(h) then ((M1,M2), (N1, N2)) ∈ S(h).
We write h ⊢ M ↔ N for (M,N) ∈ S(h), and in this case we say that M and
N are homologous w.r.t. h.
The analysis of a hedge is the set of all message pairs obtained by “open-
ing” the messages of h via decryption or projection. The irreducibles are those
elements in the analysis of a hedge that cannot be reduced further. Formally:
Definition 8 (Analysis). The analysis A(h) of a hedge h is defined as the least
set that satisfies:
– h ⊆ A(h);
– if ({M}k, {N}j) ∈ A(h) and (k, j) ∈ A(h) then (M,N) ∈ A(h);
– if ((M1, N1), (M2, N2)) ∈ A(h) then (M1,M2) ∈ A(h) and (N1, N2) ∈ A(h).
Moreover, we define the irreducibles I(h) of a hedge h as
I(h) , A(h) \ ({(C,D) ∈ A(h) | C ≡ {M}k, D ≡ {N}j, (k, j) ∈ A(h)}
∪ {((M1, N1), (M2, N2)) ∈ A(h)})
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It should be noted that all elements that can be reduced in the analysis can be
derived from the irreducibles via synthesis, i.e. S(I(h)) = S(A(h)). Lastly, since
every hedge is a finite set, its analysis and irreducibles are also finite.
Hedge simulations Let us recall that H and P are the set of all hedges and the
set of all processes, respectively. A hedged relation R is a subset of H×P × P .
We write h ⊢ PRQ when (h, P,Q) ∈ R. Moreover, we say that R is consistent
if, for all h ∈ H , h ⊢ PRQ implies that the hedge h is consistent.
Definition 9 (Hedged simulation). A consistent hedged relation R is a hedged
simulation if, whenever h ⊢ PRQ we have that:
– if P
τ
−→ P ′ then there exists Q′ such that Q =⇒ Q′ and h ⊢ P ′RQ′;
– if P
a
−→ (νm)〈M〉P ′ and {m}∩(fn(P )∪n(π1(h))) = ∅ then there exist b ∈ N
and a concretion (νn)〈M〉Q′ such that h ⊢ a↔ b, {n}∩(fn(Q)∪n(π2(h))) =
∅, Q
b
=⇒ (νn)〈M〉Q′ and I(h ∪ {(M,N)}) ⊢ P ′RQ′;
– if P
a
−→ (x)P ′ then there exist b ∈ N and an abstraction (y)Q′ such that
h ⊢ a ↔ b, Q
b
=⇒ (y)Q′ and for all B ⊂ N finite such that B ∩ (fn(P ) ∪
fn(Q) ∪ n(h)) = ∅ and h ∪ idB is consistent, for all pairs (M,N) of ground
terms, if h ∪ idB ⊢M ↔ N then h ∪ idB ⊢ P
′{M/x}RQ′{N/y}.
The first condition requires that for each τ -transition from P there is a path of
τ -transition from Q such that the two target processes are in the simulation R.
The second condition requires that for each output transition of P , labelled with
a, there is an output transition from Q labelled with b (and possibly preceded by
some silent transitions); moreover, a and b are homologous in h and the processes
after the two output operations are paired in R w.r.t. a consistent hedge that
extends h by pairing the two messages M and N . The last condition requires
that for each input transition of P with label a, there is an input transition from
Q labelled with b (and possibly preceded by some silent transitions); moreover,
a and b are homologous in h and for all finite set B of fresh names w.r.t. P , Q
and h, the abstractions (x)P ′ and (x)Q′ are paired in the simulation R for each
input messages (M,N) homologous by h ∪ idB.
Definition 10 (Hedged bisimulation and bisimilarity). A hedged simula-
tion R is a hedged bisimulation if R−1 = {(h−1, Q, P ) | h ⊢ PRQ} is also a
hedged simulation (where h−1 = {(N,M)|(M,N) ∈ h}).
Hedged bisimilarity, written ∼, is the greatest hedged bisimulation, i.e. the
union of all hedged bisimulations.
Remarkably, hedged bisimilarity coincides with barbed bisimilarity [3].
4 Decidability of hedged bisimulation for finite processes
Definition 9 does not provide us with a means for checking bisimilarity. In this
Section we address this issue, following, when possible, the approach in [4].
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Clearly, bisimilarity is undecidable for general, infinite processes; hence, we
focus on finite processes, i.e. without replication. Even on finite processes de-
cidability of hedged bisimilarity is not obvious, since the third condition in Def-
inition 9 requires to check the equivalence of two abstractions for an infinite
number of messages w.r.t. any finite set of fresh names. In this section we prove
that there is a finite bound on the number of these names and messages. If this
bound exists, then the hedged bisimilarity is trivially decidable.
The idea behind our result, as in [4], is the following: if (x)P is finite, then it
can inspect a message (using let and guard operators) up to a certain depth k.
If a message M with more than k nested constructors is received by (x)P , then
it can only be partially analysed by P . Hence, all messages M ′ equivalent to M
up to depth k will not cause any difference in the execution of (x)P , apart from
output messages. Indeed, P{M/x} and P{M ′/x} can output different messages
(i.e. different parts of M and M ′ respectively), but we notice that:
– the two outputs are derived fromM andM ′ by applying the same operations;
– only messages obtained through decryption are interesting, since they can
update the hedge h yielding a richer theory.
We now proceed to formalize this idea.
Definition 11 (Maximal constructor depth). The maximal constructor
depth mcd(M) of a message M is defined inductively by the clauses
mcd(n ∈ N ) = 0 mcd((M1,M2)) = max(mcd(M1),mcd(M2)) + 1
mcd(x ∈ V) = 0 mcd({V }K) = mcd(V ) + 1
and then extended to boolean formulas as follows:
mcd(true) = 0 mcd(φ1 ∧ φ2) = max(mcd(φ1),mcd(φ2))
mcd(¬φ) = mcd(φ) mcd([M = N ]) = max(mcd(M),mcd(N))
Definition 12 (k-homologous). Given h ∈ H and M,N ∈M, we define
h ⊢k M ↔ N
△
⇐⇒ h ⊢M ↔ N and k = max(mcd(M),mcd(N))
Whenever h ⊢k M ↔ N we say that M and N are k-homologous in h.
The notion of maximal constructor depth is readily extended to hedges:
mcd(h) , max{k | ∃(M,N) ∈ h : h ⊢k M ↔ N}
Lemma 1. Let h ∈ H andM,N ∈M be such that max(mcd(M),mcd(N)) = k.
If there is a finite set of names B ⊂ N such that
– B ∩ n(h) = ∅;
– h ∪ idB is consistent;
– h ∪ idB ⊢k M ↔ N
then there exists B′ ⊂ N with the same properties and such that |B′| ≤ 2k.
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Proof. If |B| ≤ 2k or h ⊢ M ↔ N , then the thesis follows trivially and B′ = B
or B = ∅, respectively. Otherwise,M and N are in the synthesis S(h∪ idB) and,
at worst, all names in M and N are in B. Since k = max(mcd(M),mcd(N)) and
both encrypt and pairing are binary constructors, M and N can be represented
as binary trees with height k. A binary tree of height k has at most 2k leafs,
hence B can be reduced to a set B′ such that |B′| ≤ 2k without losing any
property in the hypothesis. ⊓⊔
Lemma 1 leads us to the definition of d-hedged bisimulation: a hedged bisim-
ulation up to a bound d on message depth and a bound 2d on fresh names.
Definition 13 (d-hedged simulation). For any integer d ≥ 0, a consistent
hedged relation R is a d-hedged simulation if whenever h ⊢ PRQ we have that:
– if P
τ
−→ P ′ then there exists Q′ such that Q =⇒ Q′ and h ⊢ P ′RQ′;
– if P
a
−→ (νm)〈M〉P ′ and {m}∩(fn(P )∪n(π1(h))) = ∅ then there exist b ∈ N
and a concretion (νn)〈M〉Q′ such that h ⊢ a↔ b, {n}∩(fn(Q)∪n(π2(h))) =
∅, Q
b
=⇒ (νn)〈M〉Q′ and I(h ∪ {(M,N)}) ⊢ P ′RQ′;
– if P
a
−→ (x)P ′ then there exist b ∈ N and an abstraction (y)Q′ such that
h ⊢ a ↔ b, Q
b
=⇒ (y)Q′ and for all B ⊂ N , where |B| ≤ 2d, B ∩ (fn(P ) ∪
fn(Q) ∪ n(h)) = ∅ and h ∪ idB is consistent, for all pairs (M,N) of ground
terms, if ∃k ≤ d h ∪ idB ⊢k M ↔ N then h ∪ idB ⊢ P ′{M/x}RQ′{N/y}.
Definition 14 (d-hedged bisimulation and bisimilarity). A d-hedged bisim-
ulation is a d-hedged simulation R such that R−1 = {(h−1, Q, P ) | h ⊢ PRQ},
where h−1 = {(N,M)|(M,N) ∈ h}, is also a d-hedged simulation.
The d-hedged bisimilarity, written ∼d, is the greatest d-hedged bisimulation,
i.e. the union of all d-hedged bisimulations.
These definitions immediately lead to the following results.
Proposition 1. (a) Every hedged bisimulation is also a d-hedged bisimulation,
for any d ≥ 0.
(b) For any d > 0, a d-hedged bisimulation is also a (d−1)-hedged bisimulation.
Proof. (a) By removing the cardinality constraint on the set B and requiring
only its finiteness, we get the definition of hedged simulation; hence hedged
simulations satisfy the definition of d-hedged simulation for any d.
(b) Let h be a hedge and d > 0; it is trivial to check that if h ⊢ P ∼d Q then
h ⊢ P ∼d−1 Q. ⊓⊔
We now aim to show that, for any two processes P,Q, there exists d ≥ 0 such
that ∃h ∈ H h ⊢ P ∼d Q⇒ ∃h ∈ H h ⊢ P ∼ Q. This does not hold for arbitrary
infinite processes since these can analyse messages of arbitrary depth. Therefore,
we now consider only the fragment of spi-calculus without replication.
It should be noted that let and guard operators are the only constructs that
can check the structure of messages. For instance, the process c(x).[x = t].P uses
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the term t to “test” a message received along channel c; therefore, any message
with depth greater than t’s will fail the test, and hence we can consider to send
the process only messages with depth up-to that of t. This observation leads to
the following definition of analysis depth.
Definition 15 (Analysis depth). Let P be a finite process. The analysis depth
of P , denoted by ad(P ), is defined inductively by the clauses
ad(0) = 0 ad(P |Q) = ad(P ) + ad(Q)
ad((νn)P ) = ad(P ) ad(φ.P ) = max(ad(P ),mcd(φ))
ad(M〈N〉.P ) = ad(P ) ad(P +Q) = max(ad(P ), ad(Q))
ad(M(x).P ) = ad(P ) ad(let x = t in P ) = ad(P{t′/x}) + mdd(t)
where, in the case of the let operator, t′ is any message such that mcd(t′) =
mcd(t) (e.g., t′ can be obtained by nesting mcd(t) encryptions with a fresh name)
and the maximal destructor depth of a term is defined as follows:
mdd(n) = 0 mdd({t1}t2) = max(mdd(t1),mdd(t2))
mdd(x) = 0 mdd((t1, t2)) = max(mdd(t1),mdd(t2))
mdd(πi(t)) = mdd(t) + 1 i = 1, 2 mdd(Dt2(t1)) = max(mdd(t1),mdd(t2)) + 1.
Definition 16 (Critical depth). Let P and Q be two finite processes and let
h be a hedge. The critical depth CD(h, P,Q) is defined by
CD(h, P,Q) , mcd(h) + max(ad(P ), ad(Q)) + 1
Remark 1. In the definition of analysis depth (Definition 15) we have taken into
account also the analysis done by matching operators. This differs from Hu¨ttel’s
work about framed bisimilarity, where in the definition of the analysis depth
(there called “maximal destruction depth” [4, Def. 13]) it is ad([M = N ].P ) =
ad(P ). In fact, it is crucial to consider also the matching operator. As an example,
let us consider the following processes and frame-theory pair:
P = a(x).[x = {a}a].a¯〈a〉.0 Q = a(x).0 (fr, th) = ({a}, ∅)
According to [4] the critical depth would be CD((fr, th), P,Q) = 0; hence {a}a
would not be considered as a possible input message, since mcd({a}a) = 1 and
(fr, th) 6⊢0 {a}a ↔ {a}a. Therefore P and Q would behave similarly for each
input message tested by Hu¨ttel’s algorithm, leading to incorrectly conclude that
(fr, th) ⊢ P ∼ Q. This does not happen if the analysis depth takes into account
the number of constructors used by matching operators, as in Definition 15. ⊓⊔
As we will formally see below, when checking if a d-hedged simulation exists,
we can correlate two input P
a
−→ (x)P ′ and Q
b
−→ (x)Q′ w.r.t. a hedge h, simply
by testing the equivalence between P ′ and Q′ w.r.t. messages with maximal
constructor depth less or equal to CD(h, P,Q). Moreover, Lemma 1 limits the
number of fresh names we must consider to 2CD(h,P,Q).
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We will now prove that, if P,Q are finite processes and d = CD(h, P,Q) then
∃h ∈ H h ⊢ P ∼d Q =⇒ ∃h ∈ H h ⊢ P ∼ Q.
This result is based on the definition of d-pruning and two lemmata that show
the equivalence of the transition system when considering only messagesM such
that mcd(M) ≤ CD(h, P,Q).
Definition 17 (d-pruning). Let M and N be two messages and h a consistent
hedge such that h ⊢ M ↔ N . For d ≥ 0, the d-pruning of M and N w.r.t. h,
denoted by prd(h,M,N) is defined by cases as follows:
– if (M,N) ∈ h then for all d : prd(h,M,N) , (h,M,N)
– if (M,N) 6∈ h then
pr0(h,M,N) = (h ∪ id{a}, a, a) where a ∈ N is fresh
prd+1(h, {U}J , {V }K) = (h
′, {M ′}J , {N
′}K)
where (J,K) ∈ h
and prd(h, U, V ) = (h
′,M ′, N ′)
prd+1(h, (L1, R1), (L2, R2)) = (h
′′, (L′1, R
′
1), (L
′
2, R
′
2))
where prd(h, L1, L2) = (h
′, L′1, L
′
2)
and prd(h
′, R1, R2) = (h
′′, R′1, R
′
2).
Intuitively, the d-pruning of a message pair (M,N) generates a message pair
(M ′, N ′) where subterms appearing at levels greater than d are replaced by
fresh names w.r.t. h, M and N .
Critical depth and d-pruning are readily extended to processes and messages:
CD(h, P ) , CD(h, P, P ) prd(h,M) , prd(h,M,M)
Lemma 2. Let (x)P be an abstraction of a finite process, h be a hedge and
d = CD(h, P ). For every message M ,
P{M/x} > P ′M{M/x} ⇐⇒ P{N/x} > P
′
N{N/x}
where the same reduction rule is used, N = π2(prd(h,M)) and
– in the case of the guard reduction: P ′M = P
′
N
– in the case of the let reduction: P ′M = Q{[[t{M/x}]]/y} and P
′
N = Q{[[t{N/x}]]/y},
for some Q.
Proof. Let us consider the case of guard reduction, i.e., P{M/x} = (φ.Q){M/x}
for some Q and [[φ{M/x}]] = true. We only need to show that
[[φ{M/x}]] ⇐⇒ [[φ{N/x}]]
We proceed by induction on the structure of φ. The inductive cases are easy:
[[¬φ{M/x}]] ⇐⇒ ¬[[φ{M/x}]]
IH
⇐⇒ ¬[[φ{N/x}]] ⇐⇒ [[¬φ{N/x}]]
[[(φ ∧ ψ){M/x}]] ⇐⇒ [[φ{M/x}]] ∧ [[ψ{M/x}]]
IH
⇐⇒ [[φ{N/x}]] ∧ [[ψ{N/x}]] ⇐⇒ [[(φ ∧ ψ){N/x}]]
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Let us consider the base case of matching predicate [t1 = t2]. If fv(t1) ∪
fv(t2) = ∅ then the result of the matching is independent from the message
and the lemma trivially holds. Otherwise, i.e. fv(t1)∪ fv(t2) = {x}, the matching
[t1 = t2]{M/x} is true if and only if [[t1{M/x}]] ≡ [[t2{M/x}]]. Moreover, the first
condition of Definition 2 requires t1{M/x} and t2{M/x} to have the same type.
Therefore, for each path in the syntactic tree of t1 ending with an occurence of
x, there is an equivalent path in t2 ending with either an occurrence of x or a
message of the same type of M ; and vice versa for the occurrences of x in t2.
Hence, without loss of generality we can limit ourselves to matchings of the form
[x = x] (which is trivial) and [x = t]—which we show next.
If mcd(M) ≤ d then prd(M) =M and the lemma is proved. If mcd(M) > d
then mcd(M) ≥ mcd(N) ≥ d > mcd(t), since d is the depth of the pruning.
Therefore it holds that [[[x = t]{M/x}]] = [[[x = t]{N/x}]] = false and the lemma
is proved. Moreover, P ′M = P
′
N .
Let us consider now the let reduction, i.e., P{M/x} = (let y = t in Q){M/x}
for some t, Q. If M is not analysed in t thought decryption or projections (i.e.,
x does not occur inside decryption or projections in t), then the result of the
reduction will happen regardless of M and therefore the thesis holds true. The
same happens if mcd(M) ≤ d, since N = prd(M) = M and therefore the
lemma holds again. Otherwise, if M is analysed in t and mcd(M) > d then
mcd(M) ≥ mcd(N) ≥ d > mdd(t) and the reduction happens for P{M/x}
if and only if it happens for P{N/x}. From the definition of reduction for let
reduction it follows that P ′M = Q{[[t{M/x}]]/y} and P
′
N = Q{[[t{N/x}]]/y}. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3. Let (x)P be an abstraction of a finite process, h be a hedge and
d = CD(h, P ). For every message M ,
P{M/x}
α
−→ P ′M{M/x} ⇐⇒ P{N/x}
α
−→ P ′N{N/x}
where the same reduction rule is used, N = π2(prd(h,M)) and P
′
M depends upon
the application of the substitution {M/x} and the transition rule used.
Proof. By induction on the transition rules. Let us start with the parallel rule.
Let P = Q|U . By inductive hypothesis
Q{M/x}
α
−→ Q′{M/x} ⇐⇒ Q{N/x}
α
−→ Q′{N/x}
and therefore, the application of the parallel rule leads to
(Q|U){M/x}
α
−→ (Q′|U){M/x} ⇐⇒ (Q|U){N/x}
α
−→ (Q′|U){N/x}
and P ′M = P
′
N . The same reasoning can be used for sum and restriction rules.
For equivalence rules, only reduction rules modifies the processes substantially.
Therefore, we can use Lemma 2 and the proof steps are equivalent to the ones
of the parallel rule.
Let us consider now the input rule, i.e., P{M/x} = (t(y).Q){M/x}. Since
(t(y).Q){M/x} must be a ground process, fv(t(y).Q) ⊆ {x} and t can only be
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a name or equal to x. If x 6= t ∈ N , then the transition is independent from M
and will also occur for N . Otherwise, t = x and the transition will occur only
if M is a name. Moreover, if M ∈ N then M = prd(M) = N and therefore the
transition will also occur for (t(y).Q){N/x}. It also holds that P ′M = P
′
N .
The case for output rules is similar to input ’s, since the transition of a term
(t〈X〉.Q){M/x} only depends on the channel t.
Let us now prove the lemma for interaction rules. By inductive hypothesis:
P{M/x}
n
−→ ((y)P ′){M/x} ⇐⇒ P{N/x}
n
−→ ((y)P ′){N/x}
Q{M/x}
n
−→ ((νm)〈T 〉Q′){M/x} ⇐⇒ Q{N/x}
n
−→ ((νm)〈T 〉Q′){N/x}
therefore, the application of the interaction rule leads to
(P |Q){M/x}
τ
−→ ((νm)(P{T {M/x}/y}|Q′)){M/x}
⇐⇒ (P |Q){N/x}
τ
−→ ((νm)(P{T {N/x}/y}|Q′)){N/x}
which is our thesis, and P ′X = ((νm)(P{T {X/x}/y}|Q
′)) for X ∈ {M,N}. ⊓⊔
Theorem 1. Let P and Q be two finite processes. Then:
∃h ∈ H h ⊢ P ∼ Q if and only if ∃h ∈ H h ⊢ P ∼CD(h,P,Q) Q
Proof. By Proposition 1, any hedged bisimulation is also a d-hedged bisimula-
tion; hence, it suffices to show that if there is h ∈ H such that h ⊢ P ∼CD(h,P,Q)
Q, then there is h ∈ H such that h ⊢ P ∼ Q. This follows from Lemmata 2
and 3, since we already shown that reductions and transition system is the same
whenever we perform a pruning of depth CD(h, P,Q). Moreover, it holds that
R = {(h, P,Q) |∃h′ ∈ H ∃P ′, Q′ ∈ P ∃M,N ∈M s.t.
P = P ′{M/x}, Q = Q′{N/y}, (h′,M ′, N ′) = prd(h,M,N),
h′ ⊢ P ′{M ′/x} ∼d Q′{N ′/y}, for d = CD(h, P,Q)}
is a hedged bisimulation, since for a transition α it holds that
P ′{M/x}
α
−→ P ′′{M/x}
Lemma 3
⇐=====⇒ P ′{M ′/x}
α
−→ P ′′{M ′/x}
∼d
==⇒ Q′{N ′/y}
α
==⇒ Q′′{N ′/y}
Lemma 3
⇐=====⇒ Q′{N/y}
α
==⇒ Q′′{N/y}
and vice versa. Furthermore there exists h′′, obtained by updating h with the
effects of α, such that, from Definition 13:
(h′′′,M ′′, N ′′) = prd′(h
′′,M ′, N ′) and h′′′ ⊢ P ′′{M ′′/x} ∼d
′
Q′′{N ′′/y}
where d′ = CD(h′′, P ′′, Q′′). Therefore (h′′, P ′′{M/x}, Q′′{N/y}) ∈ R. ⊓⊔
Since every quantification is bounded, d-hedged bisimilarity is decidable on
finite processes. An algorithm is shown in Figure 3. For P,Q two finite processes
and h a hedge (which represents the initial knowledge of the attacker, e.g. public
channels, keys, etc.), HB(h, P,Q)∧HB(h−1, Q, P ) = true if and only if there is
a d such that (h, P,Q) are in a d-hedged simulation. Hence, by Theorem 1:
h ⊢ P ∼ Q ⇐⇒ HB(h, P,Q) ∧HB(h−1, Q, P ).
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1 HB(h, P,Q) =
2 for each P
τ
−→ P ′
3 se lect Q =⇒ Q′ such that
4 HB(h, P ′, Q′) ∧HB(h−1, Q′, P ′)
5 for each P
a
−→ (νm)〈t〉P ′
6 se lect Q
b
=⇒ (νn)〈t′〉Q′ such that
7 hO := I(h ∪ {(a, b)} ∪ {([[t]], [[t
′]])}) c o n s i s t e n t and
8 HB(hO, P
′, Q′) ∧HB(h−1
O
, Q′, P ′)
9 for each P
a
−→ (x)P ′
10 l e t d = CD(h, P,Q)
11 se lect Q
b
=⇒ (x)Q′ and B ⊂ N such that
12 |B| = 2d , B ∩ (fn(P ) ∪ fn(Q) ∪ n(h) ∪ {a, b}) = ∅ ,
13 hI := h ∪ {(a, b)} ∪ idB c on s i s t e n t and
14 for each (M,N) such that ∃k ≤ d : hI ⊢k M ↔ N
15 HB(hI , P
′{M/x}, Q′{N/x}) ∧HB(h−1
I
, Q′{N/x}, P ′{M/x})
Fig. 3. Algorithm for deciding hedged bisimilarity. The select statement implements a
nondeterministic exploration of the (finite) possible choices of its argument, until the
condition is satisfied; it returns true if successful, false otherwise.
5 Conclusions and further work
In this paper we have proved that hedged bisimilarity is decidable on finite
processes of the spi calculus. Our algorithm, which generalizes the ideas in [4], can
be readily applied to different encryption/decryption schemata just by changing
the congruence rules, as long as some mild conditions are satisfied. Actually, a
possible future work is to investigate the algebraic laws needed to represent in
the structural congruence the properties of various encryption algorithms: often
these laws are omitted from formalizations, leading to security flaws in protocols.
Another direction is to consider other fragments of the spi-calculus beyond finite
processes; depth- and restriction-bounded processes are particularly promising.
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